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What is an organism? An immunological answer 




The question “What is an organism?”, formerly considered as essential in biology, has now 
been increasingly replaced by a larger question, “What is a biological individual?”. On the 
grounds that i) individuation is theory-dependent, and ii) physiology does not offer a theory, 
biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that it is the theory of evolution by 
natural selection which tells us what counts as a biological individual. Here I show that one 
physiological field, immunology, offers a theory, which makes possible a biological 
individuation based on physiological grounds. I give a new answer to the question of the 
individuation of an organism by linking together the evolutionary and the immunological 




The question “What is an organism?”, formerly considered as essential in biology (e.g. 
Huxley 1852, Haeckel 1866, Loeb 1916, Goldstein 1939, Medawar 1957, Wolvekamp 1966, 
Lewontin 1983), has now been increasingly replaced by a larger question, “What is a 
biological individual?” (Hull 1978, 1992; Buss 1987; Wilson 1999; Sober 2000; Gould 2002; 
Wilson 2004). To understand why, we need to define what an individual in general is, and 
then what a biological individual is. First, what is an individual from a general perspective? It 
is critical to understand that not every particular is an individual. A particular is everything 
that can be designated through a demonstrative reference (this F). An individual is a particular 
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which, in addition, is separable, countable, has acceptably clear-cut spatial boundaries, and 
exhibits transtemporal identity, that is, the capacity to remain the “same” while changing 
through time (Chauvier 2008). Two aspects of this definition are worth emphasizing. First, 
“individual” can refer to natural objects (rocks, plants, etc.), as well as to artifacts (tables, 
cars, etc.). Second, individuality is a matter of degree: a car is better individuated than a 
cloud, which itself is better individuated than a nose. Of course, other definitions of the term 
“individual” may be suggested, but the one given here is general enough to reflect the long 
history of the ontological questions dealing with individuality, at least since Aristotle. 
What, now, is a biological individual? It is an individual that lives. There is no consensus on 
what the frontier between living and non-living individuals is, but, for the sake of the 
argument developed here, we can consider that biochemical complexity, metabolism, and 
reproduction are good candidates as characteristics of living individuals. Raising the question 
of biological individuality amounts to asking what the living individuals are in our world. To 
this question, the commonsensical answer is that organisms are. By “organism”, 
commonsense means a functionally integrated living thing. The living world seems to be 
made of trees, flies, mice and men, all of which are considered as individuals – indeed, even 
paradigmatic individuals.  
Yet, in the last three decades, several philosophers of biology, most prominently David Hull 
(e.g. Hull 1992), have argued that: i) it is by no means self-evident to individuate organisms; 
ii) the notion of a “biological individual” is much larger than that of an “organism”: 
organisms might be biological individuals, but all biological individuals are not necessarily 
organisms; iii) individuation is theory-dependent; iv) the only biological theory sufficiently 
articulated to make biological individuation possible is the theory of evolution by natural 
selection; v) the organism is only one level in the hierarchy of biological individuals, which 
may include genes, molecules, cells, organisms, groups and species (Hull 1992).  
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In this paper, I want to show that the organism is not simply one level in the hierarchy of 
biological individuals, but the most clearly individuated of all biological individuals. I accept 
(i), (ii)1 and (iii), but I reject (iv) and, as a consequence, (v). I argue that at least one 
physiological field, namely immunology, offers a theory of biological individuality. I then 
articulate immunological individuation with evolutionary individuation. I conclude that, 
among biological individuals, the organism expresses the highest degree of individuality. 
 
1. Phenomenal individuation 
What are the biological individuals in our world? We can think of three ways to individuate 
biological entities: 
 i) A phenomenal way, according to which we can easily “see” biological individuals.
 ii) A physiological way, according to which the biological world is made of a sub-
class of biological individuals, that is, organisms, which are described as functionally 
integrated units, undergoing continuous change, and made of causally interconnected 
elements. 
 iii) An evolutionary way, according to which it is the theory of evolution by natural 
selection that tells us what a biological individual is.  
Let’s first examine the phenomenal way. According to this sort of individuation, we can 
easily determine what the biological individuals are, simply because we can see them. 
Biological individuals are organisms, and organisms are easy to see in the world. In the same 
way a table is considered as a good example of an artificial individual, a horse or an ox will 
be considered as good examples of biological individuals. People who adopt this conception 
follow a commonsense view of biological individuals. The underlying idea is that we 
                                                 
1 As the majority of philosophers involved in this discussion, I disagree with (Buss 1987), who equates the 
individual and the organism, and with (Wilson and Sober 1989), who consider the individual as a special case of 
an organism. 
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certainly don’t have a very precise definition of the organism, but we don’t really need one, 
because we can all recognize organisms when we see them.  
The problem is that phenomenal individuation simply does not work as soon as one considers 
living things other than higher vertebrates. Commonsense cannot say where the individual is 
when the focus is on siphonophores, aspens, fungi or slime molds – to take but few examples 
(see especially Hull 1988, Wilson 1999 and Wilson 2004 for several other examples). What is 
more, a cell, for instance, fulfils very well all our criteria of individuality, raising the 
important question of whether a multicellular organism is better seen as one individual or a 
community of (cellular) individuals. As (Hull 1992) puts it, “commonsense is strongly biased 
by our relative size, duration, and perceptual abilities” (Hull 1992; see also Lewontin 2000: 
76-77). 
If we cannot trust our perception, how to determine what the biological individuals are? 
Following, here again, Hull, we can say that scientific theories constitute an excellent guide: 
scientific theories, in all natural sciences, offer an ontology, that is, they tell us what the 
entities of our world are (atoms, fields, genes, etc.) In other words, individuation in science is 
always theory-dependent (Hull 1992). Moreover, we have good reasons to trust scientific 
theories, because they can explain and predict what happens in the world much better than 
commonsense. Certainly the philosopher should not trust blindly what science says about our 
world, but she should see science as one excellent starting point, with theories as the best of 
all starting points. 
The next step in the reasoning is where I depart from Hull’s thesis. Before explaining why I 
disagree with Hull, I would like to sum up his point. According to Hull, the only true, highly 
structured and well articulated biological theory is the theory of evolution by natural selection 
(TENS) (Hull 1992). Therefore, the TENS is our best guide, or even our only guide, when we 
seek to determine what biological individuals are. Hull emphasizes that physiology or 
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morphology would be very useful to determine what a biological individual is, if only they 
were grounded in a theory. Unfortunately, the argument goes, there is no such thing as a 
physiological or morphological theory, and therefore we are supposedly left only with the 
TENS to individuate biological entities: 
The trouble with Haeckel’s solution to the problem of biological individuals is that morphology and 
physiology do not provide sufficiently well articulated theoretical contexts. Biologists have been 
engaged in the study of anatomy and physiology for centuries, but no “theories” of morphology and 
physiology have materialized in the same sense that evolutionary theory is a “theory”. In order to see 
the dependence of individuality on theories, one must investigate more highly articulated areas such as 
evolutionary biology. (Hull 1992: 184). 
Let’s now examine evolutionary individuation, then we will get back to physiological 
individuation. 
 
2. Individuation by the theory of evolution by natural selection (TENS) 
If individuation is always theory-dependent and if the TENS is the main, or sole, biological 
theory, then the best way to individuate biological entities is to determine what an 
evolutionary individual is. Therefore, in the massive literature on this subject, determining 
what a biological individual is amounts, most of the time, to determining what an 
evolutionary individual is. 
So, what is an evolutionary individual? The answer is given by the structure of the TENS. A 
biological individual is an evolutionary individual, that is, any entity on which natural 
selection acts. It is defined by the following characteristics, derived from the structure of the 
TENS: variation, heredity, differential fitness (Lewontin 1970). In this view, a gene, a 
genome, an organelle, a cell, an organism, or even a group or a species can all, in appropriate 
circumstances, be defined as biological individuals. This is called the “hierarchical” 
conception of evolution (Lewontin 1970, Buss 1987, Gould and Lloyd 1999, Michod 1999, 
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Gould 2002). According to this conception, the organism is only one biological individual 
among many others.2 
But the hierarchical view of biological individuality goes further. It leads to a revision of our 
ontology. We thought that the biological world was made of organisms as we see them, but 
this is simply not true, and it is individuation by natural selection that brings this to light. 
Janzen (1977) typically illustrates this attitude. He argues that while phenomenal 
individuation apparently tells us that a dandelion is that green thing in our garden, 
evolutionary individuation tells us that, in real fact, it is the extended, long-lived clone of 
dandelions that constitutes the biological individual, because it exhibits “reproductive 
fitness”. The consequence is that “there may be as few as four individual dandelions 
competing with each other for the territory of the whole of North America” (Dawkins 1982: 
254). Equally, the aphid evolutionary individual is the set of insects originating from the same 
egg and “growing” by parthenogenesis. Because they share the same genome, they cannot be 
said to compete with each other, and they constitute the “parts” of the same individual. 
Let’s now examine the foundations, and also the difficulties, of physiological individuation. 
 
3. Physiological individuation 
Here “physiology” is broadly defined as all the biological fields which deal mainly with 
“how?” questions, in contrast with “why?” questions, which are raised by evolutionary 
biology. Physiology includes, in particular, anatomy, morphology, most of molecular biology 
(including molecular genetics), and most of developmental biology (Boron 2005). What I call 
physiology here was referred to as “functional biology” by Mayr (1961), but I prefer avoiding 
the phrase “functional biology” because the etiological conception of functions points towards 
                                                 
2 A more radical view is that the living world is, from a scientific point of view, made of genes, and not of 
organisms. This view, held by (Dawkins 1982), may lead to the idea that “there is no such thing as an organism”, 
as discussed by Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: 70). What follows will make clear why I think this view is utterly 
wrong. 
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evolutionary biology. Of course, physiology and evolutionary biology are complementary, not 
conflicting, but still most biologists acknowledge that they are more physiology-oriented or 
alternatively more evolution-oriented in their everyday work. 
Physiology tries to make more solid and precise the commonsense conception of what a 
biological individual is. It says that organisms are indeed the individuals of the living world, 
but it offers an argument for this assertion. The argument is that the organism is a coherent, 
functionally integrated, whole, undergoing continuous change, and made of causally 
interconnected elements. This view, exemplified by Kant ([1790] 2007), dominates 
physiology. 
Many philosophers consider functional integration as a criterion for biological individuation  
(Wolvekamp 1977; Sober 1991; Sober 2000). I agree it is a very useful criterion, but I think it 
needs to be made much more precise. I consider that the concept of functional integration is 
too vague to offer an effective criterion for individuation, because it is too close to the 
phenomenal individuation: we simply trust our impression that the organism is a coherent 
“whole”, which we cut into functional pieces, and to which we attribute “natural boundaries” 
(like the skin). For example, what are the “natural boundaries” of the colonial organism 
Botryllus schlosseri? Each zooid has a membrane, and is, at least to some extent, an integrated 
whole, but one could say that the “true” functional integration happens at the level of the 
colony, which has a common vascular network. What, then, is the proper physiological 
individual? In organisms like ourselves, a cell is spatiotemporally localized and functionally 
integrated: what are the criteria that lead us to say that the organism is the “true” biological 
individual in this case? Functional integration is certainly a good principle, but it needs a 
more precise account, based on a criterion of individuation. 
Of course, one solution would be to say that the multicellular organism is an individual made 
of cells that are also individuals (Sober 1991). But the problem is that, if this were true, then 
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we would have no reason to believe that the organism is better individuated than a cell – in 
other words, functional integration would not define degrees of biological individuality. What 
is more, if it were true, physiology would not deal specifically with organisms, but with any 
functional unit. I think physiology is really about organisms, but needs a precise criterion to 
demonstrate so. I agree with Hull (1992) that a proper individuation needs a theory. We must 
therefore figure out whether a criterion of individuality based on a physiological theory is 
possible. In the next section, I show that, if properly understood, one field of contemporary 
functional biology, immunology, offers a theory of biological individuality.  
 
4. Individuation by a physiological theory: immunity and the biological 
individual 
 4.1. What is the relation between immunology and individuation? 
Since its inception, immunology has been considered as a key domain for the definition of 
biological individuality (Metchnikoff 1907; Loeb 1937; Medawar 1957; Burnet 1969; Tauber 
1994). Yet what one should understand by this notion of “individuality” remains unclear. 
Here I use the notion of a criterion of immunogenicity to precisely define the contribution of 
immunology to the problem of biological individuation. 
Immunology aims at finding a criterion of immunogenicity, that is, at determining why and 
when an effective immune response is triggered. An immune reaction is a biochemical 
interaction between immune receptors and antigenic patterns. In certain conditions, an 
immune reaction can lead to an immune response, that is, to immune activation, which leads 
either to the destruction of the target (lytic activity), or to the prevention of such a destruction 
(downregulatory activity). The immune system, in every organism, exerts a permanent 
surveillance of the molecular patterns expressed by the entities present in this organism (Dunn 
et al. 2002). Any entity expressing strongly abnormal patterns will be rejected by the immune 
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system. A criterion of immunogenicity is precisely an attempt to say what exactly this 
“abnormality” is. Hence, the immune system, by its surveillance activity, defines what will be 
accepted, and what will be rejected, by the organism, and therefore a criterion of 
immunogenicity constitutes a criterion of inclusion for the organism: the distinction between 
the entities which will stick together as constituents of the organism, and those which will be 
rejected from the organism, is made by the immune system.3 As a consequence, the immune 
system is certainly not the same thing as the organism, but it is a sub-system of the organism, 
the activity of which leads to the discrimination between what is a part of the organism, and 
what is not. This discrimination happens through time (i.e., it is diachronic): for instance, a 
proper criterion of immunogenicity must explain why an organism with one kidney at time 1 
can have a second, perfectly tolerated kidney, coming from its twin brother, at time 2. 
Immunity offers a criterion of diachronic inclusion, that is, a criterion for what makes the 
organism a unit constituted of different entities through time. The idea that the immune 
system can explain what the constituents (parts) of the organism are has been intuitively 
expressed many times (e.g., Gould and Lloyd 1999: 11906). What is needed now is a precise 
account of how this organismic individuation works. 
Naturally, I am not saying that immunology is the only physiological field that can help to 
give a precise account of organismic individuality. I am saying that immunology is ready to 
answer Hull’s challenge, because it offers a criterion of individuality grounded in a 
physiological theory. It is very likely that developmental biology, studies of metabolism, 
studies of phenotypic plasticity, among others, could also play an important role in defining 
organismic individuality, but I leave to others the task of determining whether or not they can 
offer a proper theory and hence a proper criterion of individuality. 
                                                 
3 Of course, other biological activities lead to the rejection of some entities. We can think of metabolic activities: 
nutrition (rejection of faecal matter) and breathing (rejection of CO2). Nevertheless, by these metabolic activities, 
the organism assimilates something, and rejects the by-product of its own assimilation activity. By contrast, the 
immune system accepts or rejects living entities (organs, tissues, bacteria, parasites, even viruses – which we 
consider as living entities) themselves as parts of its identity. 
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Before examining in details how immunological individuation works, I shall examine a 
possible objection: aren’t there very few organisms in nature that possess an immune system? 
If this is indeed the case, then how can I claim to build on immunology a general 
physiological theory of biological individuation, supposed to hold for all organisms?  
 
 4.2. The domain of an immunological theory of individuation 
My answer is that this is simply not true that only very few organisms (i.e., higher 
vertebrates) have an immune system. For several decades, immunologists have believed that 
immunity was limited to jawed vertebrates, because of an illegitimate focus on lymphocytes, 
seen as the only “true” immune actors. Nevertheless, it is now clear to all immunologists that 
immunity is ubiquitous (Kurtz and Armitage 2006; Pradeu 2009): in all organisms in which 
immunologists have looked for an immune system, they have found one, and most of the time 
a very complex one. 
What, then, is immunity? One can talk of an immune system each time one finds specific 
interactions between receptors and ligands, which can lead to the destruction (lysis) of the 
target. With such a definition in mind, one finds immunity in all organisms. Let us examine 
two cases, the well-known insect Drosophila, and plants. The Drosophila possesses an 
immune surveillance system, especially thanks to its “Toll” receptors, with which it can sense 
pathogens (Khush, Leulier and Lemaitre 2002). Interestingly, an equivalent of these receptors 
exists in mammals, where they are called “Toll-like receptors”, and play a key role in 
initiating immune responses. 
Plants have several immune mechanisms, which can be classified according to two lines of 
defense. The first one is the direct recognition of pathogen-associated molecular patterns by 
plant transmembrane receptors. The second one, called the “indirect” pathway, is the 
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recognition of specific effector molecules produced by the pathogen. It consists, like 
mammalian adaptive immunity, in a highly specific recognition of pathogen products. It is 
mostly triggered by NBS-LRR proteins, that is, proteins encoded by resistance (R) genes and 
containing a nucleotide-binding site (NBS) and leucine-rich repeats (LRR) (DeYoung and 
Innes 2006). 
Here lies what is probably one of the most important immunological revolutions of the last 
decade. The clear-cut separation between “adaptive” immunity (sometimes equated with 
“specific immunity”) and “innate” immunity has vanished (Vivier and Malissen 2005). 
Adaptive immunity was attributed to jawed vertebrates only. Innate immunity was considered 
to be non-specific, but in fact, from a biochemical point of view, it is specific. Organisms with 
innate immunity were also said to have no immune “memory”, i.e. no capacity to mount a 
more rapid and more efficient immune response in case of a second contact with the same 
antigen. Yet, here again, many organisms with “innate” immunity have been found to have 
this capacity (Kurtz and Armitage 2006). The consequence is that today’s immunologists 
admit that the old clear-cut boundary between innate and adaptive immunity is blurred, or 
even non-existent.  
According to an emerging consensus, even unicellular organisms possess an immune system 
that is, a system of receptors recognizing abnormal patterns. It is a genome’s immunity, which 
can be based on CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) 
(Barrangou et al. 2007), or on similar mechanisms, probably analogous to ARN interference, 
found in eukaryotes (Plasterk 2002). 
Thus, we can conclude that immunity is ubiquitous both in multicellular and in unicellular 
organisms, and hence that it can be the basis for a general physiological theory of organismic 
individuation. With these very important precisions in mind, we can now go back to our main 
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question: what criterion of immunogenicity should we adopt, and how can it be the basis for a 
physiological theory of individuation? 
 
 4.3. Which criterion of immunogenicity should we adopt? 
For sixty years now, immunologists have suggested that the proper criterion of 
immunogenicity consists in the discrimination between “self” and “nonself”, and that this 
discrimination tells us what a biological individual is (Burnet and Fenner 1949, Burnet 1969, 
Langman and Cohn 2000). I agree that immunology offers a physiological theory of 
individuation, but I do not consider that this theory can be grounded in the discrimination 
between self and nonself. 
The self-nonself criterion is now increasingly regarded with suspicion (Tauber 1994; 
Anderson and Matzinger 2000; Pradeu and Carosella 2006a; Greenspan 2007). According to 
this criterion, an organism does not trigger an immune response against its own constituents, 
whereas it triggers an immune response against every foreign entity (except, of course, in 
cases defined as pathological). Nonetheless, recent discoveries in two critical areas, immune 
autoreactivity and immune tolerance, prove that this criterion is inadequate.  
First, lymphocytes that do not react at all with “self” constituents of the body simply die. To 
be selected, both in primary organs and at the periphery, lymphocytes must be continuously 
stimulated by endogenous antigenic patterns. Furthermore, this normal autoreactivity 
concerns not only immune interactions, but also immune effector mechanisms: for instance, 
macrophages react to dying “self” cells of the body and eat them (they are the “scavengers” of 
the body) (Taylor et al. 2005), and regulatory T cells are “self” cells which respond to other 
“self” cells by downregulating their activity (Sakaguchi 2006).  
Second, recent research has shown that immune tolerance is very common. Immune tolerance 
refers to the absence of immune response to foreign entities even if immune interactions with 
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them occur. In particular, all known multicellular organisms are hosts of many bacteria, 
parasites, and viruses. For instance, in a human being, commensal and symbiotic bacteria 
outnumber eukaryotic cells by at least one order of magnitude (Xu and Gordon 2003). 
Though these foreign entities are sometimes deleterious and can even kill their host, in many 
cases they are beneficial to the host, and play a functional role. Another example is that the 
mother does not reject the fetus, though it is genetically different from her.  
   Instead of the self-nonself criterion, I prefer the “continuity criterion” (Pradeu and Carosella 
2006b), according to which every strong molecular discontinuity in the antigenic patterns 
(whether endogenous or exogenous) with which immune receptors interact induces an 
immune response. There is a discontinuity if there is a strong modification of molecular 
patterns with which immune cells interact: to put it very simply, the immune system responds 
to strongly “unusual” patterns. The criterion is molecular difference, as stated in the self-
nonself theory, but not the origin of the molecular pattern (i.e. endogenous or exogenous), 
contrary to what is stated in the self-nonself theory.  
Immune habituation works both ways: when the immune system responds to an unusual 
antigen (whether endogenous or exogenous), the second response is usually more rapid and 
more efficient; but, according to the continuity criterion, when the immune system reacts but 
does not respond to a usual antigen (whether endogenous or exogenous), the second response 
is likely to be weaker. This is called induction of tolerance by induction of continuity. 
Therefore, the repeated presentation of an antigen in non-immunogenic conditions leads to a 
subsequent tolerance of this antigen. Non-immunogenic conditions are: small quantities of 
antigen, antigen introduced progressively, and with no proinflammatory signals. Tolerance of 
microorganisms, feto-maternal tolerance, chimerism, some cases of graft tolerance could all 
be examples of induction of tolerance by induction of continuity. 
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The continuity criterion accounts for immune autoreactivity, because it states that immune 
receptors interact with normal constituents of the body with a medium strength (which is 
measurable very precisely by its specificity, affinity, and avidity). Interactions are very strong 
when immune receptors meet unusual patterns. The continuity criterion also accounts for 
immune tolerance, with the concept of induction of continuity.  
Thus, the criterion of immunogenicity we are looking for cannot be the self-nonself criterion, 
which is grounded in a wrong idea, the preservation of endogenous elements by the immune 
system of the organism. By contrast, the continuity criterion integrates autoreactivity and 
tolerance; it offers an experimentally adequate account of immune phenomena, and therefore 
it can be the criterion of inclusion we are looking for. 
This criterion of inclusion is derived from a true physiological theory of individuation, 
because i) it is composed of several, hierarchically organized, hypotheses, ii) it applies to all 
organisms, iii) it explains current data, and iv) it makes new predictions. 
The next question is: what does this physiological theory of individuation tell us about the 
definition of the organism? 
 
5. The organism, a set of interconnected heterogeneous constituents, 
interacting with immune receptors 
 5.1. Definition of the organism 
Let us start with the usual physiological definition of an organism: the organism is a 
functionally integrated whole, which undergoes continuous change, and which is made of 
interconnected elements, characterized by causal dependence (e.g. Sober 2000). The 
constituents of John may causally interact with the constituents of Tim, but not with the same 
intensity, timing, and scale as John’s constituents interact with each other. This definition is 
certainly correct, but it is too general. Biochemistry can help us to make it more precise. 
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Indeed, though functional integration can be observed at many levels in the organism, the 
finest level is that of proteins: the parts of an organism (organs, tissues, cells, and even 
constituents with cells) are indeed interconnected by strong biochemical interactions, 
involving mainly proteins-proteins interactions (Lesk 2004). In plants, regulation and 
coordination of metabolism, growth, and morphogenesis often depend on a network of 
chemical signals (Taiz and Zeiger 2006). In many instances, in multicellular organisms, a cell 
which does not receive signals from its local environment and which does not send signals to 
it rapidly dies. The elucidation of protein-protein interactions is a very active field in 
contemporary biology. It will probably be in the near future the best level to understand 
functional integration within an organism, because, again, the strength, timing and extension 
of “inner” biochemical interactions are very different from those occurring between two 
distinct organisms (Lesk 2004). 
The problem is that, even at a biochemical level, functional integration is local. In other 
words, two sub-systems in an organism can be quasi-independent (Lewontin 2000: 94). It is at 
this point that the contribution of immunology is critical: immune interactions are 
fundamentally organismic (i.e. they concern the whole organism), because they are systemic, 
for the lymphatic system (or its equivalent) is an extensive system, collecting extracellular 
fluid (lymph) from all tissues of the organism. All the tissues and cells of the organism are 
therefore under the influence and control of the immune system. 
Thus, immune interactions are a sub-set of biochemical interactions, but: i) they are systemic 
(as opposed to local), ii) they offer a criterion of inclusion, because they are responsible for 
the acceptance or rejection of constituents in the organism. Now we reach the heart of the 
argument. When we link together the general biochemical point of view and the specific but 
systemic immunological point of view, we obtain the following definition of an organism: 
 16 
An organism is a functionally integrated whole, made up of heterogeneous 
constituents that are locally interconnected by strong biochemical interactions and 
controlled by systemic immune interactions that repeat constantly at the same medium 
intensity. 
It should be clear that the immune interactions are critical in this conception and that they 
constitute the basis of our physiological individuation of the organism. First, whereas 
biochemical interactions are most of the time local, immune interactions are systemic. 
Second, while the strength of biochemical interactions is not always easy to define (because 
of their diversity), immune interactions are receptor-ligand interactions, the strength of which 
is very clearly defined in terms of specificity, affinity and avidity. Immune cells interact in a 
medium, but not too strong, way with the antigenic patterns of the organism’s constituents: if 
these interactions are very weak, the target (whether endogenous or exogenous) dies; if they 
are very strong, it means than an immune response, leading to a possible rejection of the 
target, has been triggered; it is only if they remain at the same intermediate intensity that we 
observe a normal homeostatic state in the organism. These interactions must also be repeated 
continuously (constantly), which means regularly, and not, of course, without any 
interruption. 
My definition does not imply that everything which does not trigger an immune response 
from an organism belongs to this organism: for instance, two identical twins can tolerate each 
other’s organs in case of transplantation, but it does not entail that they are one and the same 
organism. Instead, my criterion requires both presence and inclusion (absence of rejection). 
I also believe that my definition sheds some light on the frequently made assertion that every 
organism is “heterogeneous” (Lewontin 2000). 
 
 5.2. The heterogenity of the organism 
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According to my definition, the constituents of an organism are heterogeneous. The word 
“heterogeneous” is not synonymous with “different”, it etymologically means “coming from 
the other”, that is, in this context, coming from what is initially the “outside” of the organism. 
My discussion of immune tolerance has shown the importance of this heterogeneity: an 
organism is made of constituents that do not need to have originated in it. In other words, an 
organism is made of many foreign things, it is never endogenously constructed. I can illustrate 
this heterogeneity by an examination of the functional role of indigenous symbiotic bacteria 
in mammals (Hooper and Gordon 2001). For example, each human being is constituted of 
indigenous symbiotic bacteria that clearly outnumber his or her “own” cells, originating from 
the egg cell. The majority of these bacteria live in our intestine. Most of them are obligatory 
symbionts, meaning that they cannot survive outside the host, and the host cannot survive in 
their absence. They play indispensable physiological (functional) roles: in particular, gut 
bacteria are needed for digestion. Strikingly, these symbiotic bacteria, far from being foreign 
enemies that our immune system should fight, also play an indispensable immune role in our 
bodies (Noverr and Huffnagle 2004). These bacteria have permanent and constitutive 
biochemical interactions with other parts of the host. There is no fundamental difference 
between interactions of the host’s immune receptors with these symbiotic bacteria, and 
interactions of the host’s immune receptors with endogenous constituents. In both cases, what 
we observe is a regulated immune reactivity. Consequently, these endosymbiotic bacteria are 
not just “here” in the organism, they are parts of the organism (O’Hara and Shanahan 2006; 
Xu et al. 2007). An objection could be that the gut is an interface of the organism, not a true 
“internal” part of it. Nevertheless, of the ten mammalian organ systems, eight (integumentary, 
digestive, respiratory, excretory, reproductive, immune, endocrine, circulatory) have 
persistent associations with normal bacteria (the exceptions being, so far, the musculoskeletal 
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and nervous systems) (McFall-Ngai 2002). The organism is a “local concentration of 
interfaces” (Patrick Blandin, personal communication). 
Obligate indigenous bacteria are in no way limited to mammals, we find them in arthropods, 
plants, colonial organisms, etc. For example, Wolbachia bacteria, which are present in many 
multicellular organisms, have been proved to be indispensable for the development of a 
parasitic wasp, Asobara tabida (Dedeine et al. 2001). In many plants, too, some bacteria are 
indispensable for nutrition, as illustrated by the symbiosis between the host plant and the 
bacteria Rhizobium (Kiers et al. 2003). 
Thus, every organism is a heterogeneous entity, made of different constituents from different 
origins, but unified by common interactions with immune receptors. As a consequence, a 
proper criterion of immunogenicity tells us first that the organism is a unified whole (its unity 
is grounded in biochemical and above all in immunological interactions), and second that it is 
heterogeneous. It offers therefore a dialectical understanding of the “inside” of the 
organism (Lewontin 1994): some entities usually considered as parts of the environment are 
in fact constituents of the organism’s identity. 
 
 5.3. Biological genidentity defined thanks to immune interactions 
The definition of the organism suggested here gives a precise content to the notion of 
genidentity as applied to biological entities (Locke ([1975] 1690); Lewin 1922; Reichenbach 
1956; Hull 1992). The genidentity thesis asserts that individuality through time is insured by 
the spatiotemporally continuous interactions among the constituents of a being. A classical 
objection is that it is impossible to speak of interactions among constituents without saying to 
what these interactions must be attributed, and hence without considering that a “core” 
(substratum) underlying these interactions must exist. Nevertheless, this objection can now be 
rejected: the immunogenicity criterion allows us to single out the biochemical interactions 
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that are constitutive of the organism as a whole. The (constantly repeating at the same 
medium intensity) immune interactions single out continuous biochemical interactions, which 
themselves single out the organism. 
My definition does not start with the constituents of an organism, and then asks what the 
interactions between them are. It states that every entity bearing molecular patterns that 
continuously trigger immune interactions of medium intensity is a constituent of the 
organism. What is fundamental, therefore, is the strength of the immune interactions, which 
tells us what the constituents of the organism are (e.g., endobacteria). 
 
5.4. Difference with other physiological ways to individuate biological entities 
The immunological-physiological individuation I suggest differs from both commonsense 
physiological individuation, and endogenous physiological individuation.  
First, my conception is grounded in the usual physiological definition of the organism 
(functional integration), but it certainly does not amount to the commonsense physiological 
individuation, which states that the organism is what is behind the skin (or any membrane). 
Let us go back, for instance, to the colonial organism Botryllus schlosseri. In this case, as we 
saw, commonsense individuation cannot say what the proper biological individual is, between 
the zooid and the colony. My criterion of individuality tells us that the organism in this case is 
not each zooid, but the colony characterized both by strong biochemical interactions and by a 
one and the same immune system, based on one histocompatibility system (maintained from 
the larva stage to the colony stage) (De Tomaso et al. 2005). Sometimes, my criterion gives 
the same result as the commonsense view, but it offers a scientific ground for this result: for 
instance, my criterion tells us that a mouse as we see it is indeed an individual organism, but, 
contrary to the commonsense view, it also states precisely what counts as a part of the mouse. 
Counterintuitively, gut bacteria, bacteria situated on the skin, long-tolerated parasites, etc. are 
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part of the mouse. Thus, again, I offer a proper theory, leading to ontological revisions or 
confirmations.  
Second, my criterion shows that the usual conception of the organism as an endogenous entity 
is wrong. The idea that the organism is the set of constituents originating from the egg cell, 
i.e. a genetically homogenous entity, is often expressed (e.g. Hull 1978). Immunological 
individuation shows, however, that every organism is heterogeneous – made of entities of 
different origins. 
In the last section, I try to articulate the two theoretical criteria (the immunological-
physiological one and the evolutionary one), and to show what the consequences of this 
articulation are. 
 
6. Articulating the physiological and the evolutionary individuations 
We now have two theories with which to individuate biological entities. According to the 
evolutionary criterion, there exists a hierarchy of individuals, the organism being simply one 
of them. By contrast, my physiological criterion shows that the organism expresses the 
highest level of individuality among biological individuals, for the three following reasons. 
 
 6.1. The boundaries of the “heterogenous organism” are clearly defined 
Part of Hull’s argument is that the organism does not possess clear-cut boundaries (Hull 
1992). It is true with the phenomenal definition of an organism, but not with the one given 
here. The immunological criterion of individuation allows us to take decisions, as in the case 
of Botryllus. I do not pretend that this criterion eliminates all contentious cases, but I do claim 
that the organism as I define it has more clear-cut boundaries than the other levels in the 
evolutionary hierarchy, in particular a gene (Griffiths and Stotz 2006) or a group. 
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 6.2. The “heterogenous organism” is sometimes the proper evolutionary individual 
Let us go back to clonal organisms, and especially to Janzen’s aphids (Janzen 1977). His 
point is that, during the parthenogenesis phase, the aphid organism (the observable insect) is 
not an evolutionary individual. Instead, the evolutionary individual is the set of all the insects 
originating from the same egg, because they all have the same genome, and cannot be said to 
compete with each other. The underlying idea, more or less inherited from Weismann, is that 
genetic homogeneity is the key to evolutionary individuality.  
The immunological-physiological criterion, however, suggests something else. Each 
immunological-physiological aphid4 contains intracellular symbionts, whose presence is 
required for the survival of the host. These symbionts are vertically transmitted (each aphid 
transmits its symbionts to its offspring). They are different in different aphids. They can 
mutate during the aphid lifetime, modify its fitness, and that of its offspring (O’Neill et al. 
1997). For example, Dunbar et al. (2007) show that a point mutation in Buchnera aphidicola, 
hosted by Acyrthosiphon pisum aphid, modifies the host response to heat stress, “dramatically 
affecting host fitness in a manner dependent on thermal environment”. It means that 
physiological aphids born by parthenogenesis do in fact compete with each other: they 
contain endosymbionts which vary, whose variation is inheritable, and modifies host fitness. 
The aphid case shows that the argument of genetic homogeneity can lead to wrong 
conclusions about what the evolutionary individual is. I defend an extended replicator view, 
stating that genes are not the only replicators in nature (Sterelny et al. 1996). Indeed, 
vertically-transmitted bacteria can be excellent replicators, too. 
My argument concerning aphids probably holds for most clonal organisms, especially plants, 
which massively host obligate symbiotic bacteria (Kiers et al. 2003) or fungi (van der Heijden 
et al. 1998), though the mode of transmission (vertical or horizontal) makes a difference. For 
                                                 
4 Following our definition, an immunological-physiological aphid is a small aphid insect, including its 
indigenous bacteria, fungi, etc. 
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instance, it is likely that my argument can be made for dandelions. If this is true, it will revise 
Janzen’s revision of the ontology of living entities: in many clonal organisms, the 
evolutionary individual would not be the clone, but the immunological-physiological 
organism. Hence, what counts as an evolutionary individual should not be determined by 
resorting to the sole criterion of genetic homogeneity. A precise observation of physiological, 
and especially immunological, mechanisms is needed. I do not claim that the organism as I 
define it is always the proper evolutionary individual, but that it is often necessary to start 
with the heterogeneous organism to determine what the evolutionary individual is, especially 
in all cases where endobacteria are vertically transmitted. 
I think that this conclusion extends the ideas of Leo Buss. Buss (1987) used a physiological 
domain, developmental biology, to show that the conception of the organism as a genetically 
homogenous entity was (approximately) correct only in a very limited number of species. He 
showed that many organisms are heterogeneous in the sense that, contrary to Weismann’s 
main idea, their somatic cells can mutate and subsequently give rise to germ cells. Here I use 
another physiological domain, immunology, to show that many organisms are heterogeneous 
in the sense that some of their constituents do not come from the egg cell and can be 
transmitted to their offspring and influence their fitness. Even organisms Buss considers as 
“homogenous”, e.g. arthropods, are in fact heterogeneous, because they are constituted of 
entities of different origins, which can influence their evolution. 
 
 6.3. The “heterogenous organism” controls the variations of lower-level constituents, 
especially cell lineages 
The emergence of the pluricellular organism in evolution presupposed the existence of 
mechanisms controlling the appearance of lower-level variants, especially at the level of cell 
lineages (Buss 1987). The immune system plays a critical role in this control (Buss 1987; 
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Michod 1999), which is exerted on cell lineages, but also on endobacteria (Frank 1996). As 
we saw, immune surveillance is exerted towards all the constituents of the organism. The 
immune system constantly eliminates “selfish” cell lineages, in the case of tumors in 
particular. The immune system constantly maintains the individuality of the organism by 
eliminating the replication of lower-level individuals. Naturally, it is possible that natural 
selection at a higher level (e.g. group or species) presupposes that variations at the organismic 
level should be restricted, but this control is not as regular and as efficient as in the case of the 
organism controlling its lower-level constituents.  
  
7. Conclusion 
Immunology makes a physiological theory of individuality possible. A proper criterion of 
immunogenicity offers an account of what the parts of an organism throughout its life are. An 
organism can be defined as a functionally integrated whole, made up of heterogeneous 
constituents that are locally interconnected by strong biochemical interactions and controlled 
by systemic immune interactions that repeat constantly at the same medium intensity. When 
articulated with the evolutionary criterion of individuation, this physiological criterion shows 
that the heterogeneous organism is not simply one level in a rich hierarchy of biological 
individuals, but expresses the highest level of individuality among all living things. 
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